El discurso biológico de Ayala se centra en estas tres cuestiones: 1) El hecho de la evolución. 2) Historia de la evolución. 3) Mecanismos del desarrollo y cambio evolutivos. El hecho determinante y cierto, según Ayala, es la evidencia de relaciones entre todos los organismos debidas a una común descendencia con modificaciones como lo han demostrado con abundancia la Paleontología, Anatomía comparada, Biogeografía, Embriología, Genética Molecular, Bioinformática y otras disciplinas biológicas que nos llevan a la afirmación de que el hecho (...) de la evolución de los seres vivos tiene el mismo grado de certeza que poseen los hechos históricos y científicos ampliamente confirmados. Para Ayala, explicaciones acerca del origen del mundo, del hombre y de otras criaturas se encuentran en todas las culturas. Tras la publicación del Origen de las Especies de C. Darwin en 1859, se produce gran polémica en los medios científicos, culturales y religiosos, pero pasado un período de maduración, el darwinismo logra ser aceptado especialmente bajo las formas de Neo-darwinismo y Teoría Sintética. Otro asunto muy distinto son las diversas teorías y micro-teorías que se proponen para explicar los mecanismos de la evolución de los organismos vivos que presentan todavía profundas lagunas, deficiencias y controversias que han provocado la aparición de teorías alternativas. No obstante, el darwinismo moderno constituye un peldaño importante en la reconstrucción del sinuoso y complejo proceso evolutivo de la vida a través de millones de años acudiendo a una razonable explicación causal sin que esto atente contra ningún supuesto religioso. (shrink)

Recent articles in Religious Studies have underscored the questions of whether Buddhism presents any empirical doctrines, and whether, if it does, such doctrines are false or vacuous. In what follows I want to sketch an interpretation of Buddhism according to which it does not offer doctrines which are empirically false, on the one hand, or trivially true on the other. In doing so I take my cue from an earlier, and by now classic, paper by H. H. Price. For the (...) exposition of Buddhism I take the Pali Nikāyas, the single most significant collection of texts in the Buddhist tradition. The particular doctrine which is the focus of discussion here is the kammavāda or ‘karma view’ of early Indian Buddhism, for it is the focus of much of the recent literature cited above and a doctrine which some have thought amenable to statement in empirical terms. (shrink)

Geannoteerde briefwisseling van de twee geleerden over het vraagstuk van de evolutie.

This paper responds to the issues raised by D. Chalmers by offering a research direction which is quite radical because of the way in which methodological principles are linked to scientific studies of consciousness. Neuro-phenomenology is the name I use here to designate a quest to marry modern cognitive science and a disciplined approach to human experience, thereby placing myself in the lineage of the continental tradition of Phenomenology. My claim is that the so-called hard problem that animates these Special (...) Issues can only be addressed productively by gathering a research community armed with new pragmatic tools for the development of a science of consciousness. I will claim that no piecemeal empirical correlates, nor purely theoretical principles, will really help us at this stage. We need to turn to a systematic exploration of the only link between mind and consciousness that seems both obvious and natural: the structure of human experience itself. In what follows I motivate my choice by briefly examining the current debate about consciousness at the light of Chalmer’s hard problem. Next, I outline the phenomenological strategy. Finally I conclude by discussing some of the main difficulties and consequences of this strategy. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson, in various places, has put forward an argument that is supposed to show that denying bivalence is absurd. This paper is an examination of the logical force of this argument, which is found wanting.

ABSTRACT Global biodiversity declines are increasingly recognized as profound ecological and social crises. In areas subject to colonialization, these declines have advanced in lockstep with settler colonialism and imposition of centralized resource management by settler states. Many have suggested that resurgent Indigenous-led governance systems could help arrest these trends while advancing effective and socially just approaches to environmental interactions that benefit people and places alike. However, how dominant management and conservation approaches might be decolonized (i.e., how their underlying colonial structure (...) might be addressed, transformed, and replaced) is not always clear. Here, we describe a ‘Decolonial Model of Environmental Management and Conservation’ as an alternative paradigm to dominant approaches of conservation and management. The tenets of the model describe characteristics that might be expected of decolonized management, contrasted with those of dominant state-led approaches such as those embedded in the North American Model of Wildlife Conservation. The model does not prescribe how Indigenous governments or communities ought to govern their own territories, but instead offers insights into how external management and conservation agencies and practitioners might support (or stop impeding) Indigenous-led governance. We illustrate the model with a conservation ‘bright spot’: grizzly bear stewardship in the area now referred to as the Great Bear Rainforest in British Columbia, Canada, with a focus on work led by or in collaboration with, and within the territories of, the Haíɫzaqv, Kitasoo/xai’xais, Nuxalk, and Wuikinuxv First Nations. While acknowledging the important context-specific variability among place-based management and conservation applications, we also discuss the model’s broader applicability. (shrink)